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THE STOCK MARKET, PROFIT ANDINVESTMENT
ABSTRACT
Should managers, when making investment decisions, follow the signals
given by the stock market even if those do not coincide with their own
assessments of fundamental value? This paper reviews the theoretical arguments
and examines the empirical evidence, constructing and using a new US time
series of data on the q ratio from 1900 to 1988. We decompose q -- theratio
of the market value of corporate capital to its replacement cost -- intothe
product of two terms, reflecting "fundamentals" and "valuation", the ratio of
market value to fundamentals. We then examine the relation of investment to
each of the two, using a number of alternative proxies for fundamentals. We
interpret our results as pointing, strongly but not overwhelmingly, to a larger
role of "fundamentals" than of "valuation" in investment decisions.
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In recent years economists have started to take seriously the idea that
the stock market does not always provide the best available estimate of
fundamental value. Theoretical and empirical studies along with the Crash
of 1987 have led to an upsurge of interest in theories of market
fluctuations that emphasize the role of poorly informed traders or bubbles.
If market movements do not all reflect changes in fundamental value, it is
natural to ask whether the economic response to market movements will
differ depending on their cause. This question takes on particular
importance in light of the failure of the collapse of investment, widely
predicted after the 1987 Crash, to materialize. This paper tries to sort
out the theoretical and empirical evidence on whether and how investment
responds to changes in fundamentals and in market value.
In Section I, we take up the following question. Should managers, in
making investment decisions, follow --always, sometimes, never-- the
signals given by the stock market, or more precisely by q, the vaiuation of
their capital by the asset markets, even if their own valuation of those
investment projects does not coincide with the stock market's valuation?
This question takes on considerable importance given that there is
considerable evidence suggesting that stock prices may often deviate from
fundamental values. Bosworth (1975) argued that firms should disregard the
market when they think it is wrong. Fischer and Merton (1984) in contrast
argued that firms should respond to the market valuation, even if they do
not agree with it. We reexamine the question and conclude that neither
extreme theoretical view gives correct guidance to managers. Furthermore,4
actual managerial behavior is an empirical question. We therefore turn to
the data.
In Section II, we describe the data and layout our basic empirical
approach. We look at data for the US from 1900 to 1988; one of the
contributions of this paper is to construct a series for q for that period.
Our basic strategy is then to think of q as the product of two terms,
"fundamentals" -the expected present discounted value of profits- and
"valuation" -the ratio of the market value to fundamentals-, and to see
whether investment responds equally to both. If fundamentals were
observable, then testing whether investment is driven by market or
managerial perceptions would be straightforward: the first implies that
only fundamentals should matter, while the second implies that both terms
matter equally. The obvious problem is that fundamentals are not
observable, and one must rely on proxies. We explore two different
approaches.
The first, developed in Sections III to V, relies on the use of proxies
for fundamentals in the investment equation. In Section III, we use
current dividends as a proxy for fundamentals. The rationale for using
dividends traces back to the work of Lintner (1956), and is based on the
idea that managers set dividends in line with their perceptions of
permanent earnings. In Section IV, we construct a series for the expected
present discounted value of profits under the assumption of rational
expectations; we do so by constructing the realized present discounted
value of profits and by projecting it on a set of instruments. Under both
approaches, the evidence is that firms react to both components of q, to5
fundamentals as well as to valuation, the ratio of market value to
fundamentals. Point estimates imply a stronger effect of fundamentals; the
difference is not however statistically significant.
Both sets of results are however likely to suffer from a systematic bias
in the coefficients. The use of a proxy for fundamentals implies that some
information about fundamentals will be contained in the term we use to
measure valuation -the ratio of market value to our proxy for fundamentals.
Intuition suggests that this will lead to an underestimate of the
difference between the effects of fundamentals and valuation. In Section
V1 we formalize this intuition and characterize the size of the bias in
that difference as a function of how much information about fundamentals is
actually contained in the term we construct to measure valuation. We
conclude that under plausible assunptions, the bias may be substantial. If
so, our empirical results can be interpreted as suggesting a substantially
and significantly stronger effect of fundamentals than valuation on
investment.
Our second approach, developed in Section VI, looks instead at two
specific episodes, the periods around the market crashes of 1929 and of
1987. It relies on the idea that, during those episodes, there was
widespread suspicion that the market value diverged from fundamentals.
Thus, if investment decisions depend mostly on fundamentals, one would
expect the relation between investment and market value to be weaker during
those periods. If instead investment decisions depend equally on
fundamentals and valuation, these episodes should not look abnormal.
Examination of the two episodes yields different conclusions. The 19296
period just does not fit any simple hypothesis. The 1987 experience is
consistent with the idea that firms ignored valuation and followed
fundamentals. This finding in turn explains why the crash of 1987 was not
followed by a substantial fall in investment.7
Section I. The stock market and investment
Should we expect a tight relation between investment and the stock
market? It is useful to start with an admittedly irrelevant but simple
benchmark case. Suppose that the profit function were linear in capital,
that firms had stable adjustment cost functions for capital, that managers
and asset market participants had access to the same information set and
that asset markets valued firms at their fundamental value. Then, it is
well known, from Hayashi (1982), that the ratio of investment to capital --
investmentfor short- -andthe ratio of the market value of the firm to the
replacement cost of capital --qfor short-- would move together, both
responding in the same way to expectations of profits and required rates of
return. q would not cause investment in any useful sense, although
managers would probably find it convenient to rely in part on the valuation
performed in asset markets.
A more interesting question arises when we allow for the possibility
that the valuation of investment projects by the managers of firms and the
market valuation of existing capital do not coincide. There is one well
known reason why this might be so, which is referred to in the literature
as the difference between marginal q, the shadow value of additional
capital, and average q, the value of existing capital. The two will be
different whenever marginal profit and average profit are different; the
classic example is an energy price shock that renders old capital
unprofitable to operate but encourages energy conserving investment. Other
cases include non constant returns in production, rents to non8
reproducible factors, rents in non competitive goods or factor markets, or
features of the tax system1. In our discussion, we leave this issue aside,
implicitly assuming marginal and average profit to be the same, in order to
focus on the issue we are concerned with, namely differences in the
valuation of a given investment project by managers and the market.
We thus rephrase our question as: what should managers do if their
valuation of an investment project differs from that of the market? There
are three reasons why this may be so, and all three have been examined at
length in the recent literature. First, the market may have less
information than managers. Second, even if information sets are the same,
the market may not value assets at their fundamental value, and market
valuation includes a rational speculative bubble. Prices are high relative
to fundamentals simply because they are expected to increase, or low simply
because they are expected to decrease (Blanchard and Watson 1982). Third,
the market may be subject to fads which cause market valuation to deviate
from fundamentals for long periods of time. Although the expected excess
return from buy low-sell high strategies is positive, it is sufficiently
small and the risk sufficiently large that the market does not eliminate
the deviation (DeLong, Shleifer, Suinniers, and Waidman (1987)). Suppose
that for any of these reasons, the market value deviates from the managers'
evaluation of fundamentals. What should a manager then do? Should it
react differently depending on why the two differ?
See Hayashi (1982), Abel and Blanchard (1986).9
A first answer to that question was given by gosworth (1975), who argued
that managers should simply ignore the sideshow provided by the stock
market and act upon fundamentals as they perceived it. To discuss his and
other arguments, it will be convenient to rely on the special case of risk
neutrality and no costs of adjustment. For that case, define q as the
ratio of the market valuation to the replacement cost of capital, and q (m
for managers) as the present discounted value of marginal profits, as
assessed by managers, discounted at the riskiess rate. In that case,
Bosworth argues, managers should invest to the point where the marginal
product is equal to the riskiess rate, or equivalently where q 1,
whether or not at that point this is also true of q, the stock market
valuation.
The argument would be correct if the stock market was indeed purely a
sideshow- -thatis if its only function was to value existing projects and
if existing shareowners never sold their shares-- In this case, the firm
would finance itself by borrowing at the riskless rate and it would be
acting in the interests of its owners by ignoring the stock market's
assessmentBut the stock market is also a market where firms can issue
new shares and where existing sharehowners can realize capital gains by
selling to potential buyers; the price that the market puts on these shares
is therefore relevant for investment decisions. The possibility of new
share issues was emphasized by Keynes (1936, p151), and was the initial
motivation given by Tobin for the q theory. It underlies the second answer10
to the investment-stock market relation, an answer articulated by Fischer
and Merton (1984). Fischer and Merton argued that investment decisions
should be based on the stock market valuation. Their argument is simple:
if the market is ready to accept a lower rate of return, the firm should
then invest until the marginal product of capital is equal to that rate of
return. In the case introduced above, assume that investment has proceeded
to the point where q is equal to 1. If, at that point, q exceeds 1 and
the market is ready to pay more than 1 for a share, the firm should issue
new shares and invest until q itself has been driven down to 1. At that
point q ,asassessed by managers, will be less than 1, reflecting the
decrease in the marginal product of capital. But existing shareholders
will have made a profit on each new share which has been issued. Driving
investment to the point where the market valuation of capital is equal to
its replacement cost maximizes the wealth of existing shareholders. Thus,
Fischer and Merton argue, investment should respond to stock market
movements, whether or not these movements reflect managers' assessments of
fundamentals. This however is not the end of the story, and there are at
least three reasons why the Fischer-Merton argument is incomplete.
First, within the logic of the argument, the best strategy for the firm
is indeed to issue new shares, but to use the proceeds not for physical
investment, but for lending at the riskiess rate, for example to buy
Treasury Bills. This is because investing in additional capital drives
down its marginal product below the riskiess rate, while lending at the
riskless rate is equivalent to investing in a constant returns technology.
Indeed, pushing this argument to its logical conclusion, the optimal11
strategy if q exceeds q must be to issue an infinite amount of shares and
invest the proceeds in the riskiess asset... But this leads to the second
argument.
The difference between q and q is unlikely to be invariant to the
actions of the firm, for example, the issue of new shares and the decision
whether to use the proceeds to buy Treasury bills or for physical
investment. Here, knowing why q and q differ is important. If the
difference comes from differences in information, one would expect issues
of new shares and the use of the proceeds to play the role of signals, and
to affect the market valuation. If the difference comes from speculative
bubbles or fads, we have no theoretical guidance as to what the action of
the firm may do to the difference between q and q .Seeinga firm issue
new shares and use the proceeds to invest in outside opportunities might
well prick a bubble. Put another way, the bubble may be on the capital of
the firm than on the firm itself. For all those reasons, a firm may be
reluctant to change its investment plans to take account of what it
perceives as erratic differences between q and q 2
Third, while the current shareholders benefit from the issuance of new
shares, it is clear that the issue of new shares by itself represents a
pure transfer. From whom the transfer comes depends again on why q and
differ. In the case of better information on the part of managers or in
the case of fads, the transfer is from the new shareholders to the existing
2 Thisparagraph summarizes the essential conclusion of a large literature
on the adverse signalling effects of new equity issues. See for example
Myers and Majluf (1984).12
ones. In the case of rational bubbles, the transfer is from future buyers
of the shares to existing shareholders: new shareholders are not worse off
in expected value, as they rationally expect to recover the high purchase
price by selling at an even higher price to others in the future. In
addition, in the case of fads, if the money from new share issues is used
for physical investment driving the marginal product down, the set of
existing and new shareholders as a whole is unambiguously worse off as a
result. Thus, the managers, who will in time be responsible to the new as
well as the old shareholders may be reluctant to engage in such behavior.
While our discussion of the Fischer-Merton argunient has proceeded under
the assumption that firms were issuing new shares, similar issues arise
even when issuing or repurchasing shares is not an option. In that case,
current shareholders will realize their gains only if and when they sell
their own shares. Thus, what managers should do will depend both on their
perceptions of how long they expect market value to deviate from
fundamentals, and on how long they expect their shareholders to hold on to
their shares. Put another way, managers who are primarily concerned with
their long term shareholders should follow their own judgexnents rather than
the market's judgement in evaluating investment projects. But managers of
firms whose shareholders have short horizons should follow Fischer and
Merton and invest in relation to market valuation. They may indeed have a
strong incentive to do so to the extent that managerial compensation
(broadly defined) is tied in part to the market's judgement of their
performance.13
Thus, when all is said and done, theory does not provide an unambiguous
answer as to whether firms should invest be based on market or managerial
perceptions.We therefore turn to the data.
Section II. Methodology and data
The investment equation.
We introduced a simple benchmark at the beginning of the previous
section. We assumed that marginal and average profit were equal, that
managers and the market had similar information sets, and that there was no
arbitrage failure and no bubbles. Under that benchmark, investment
depended on the expected present discounted value of profits accruing to an
additional unit of capital. The equality of marginal and average profit
implied in turn that this expected present discounted value of marginal
profits was equal to (F/K), where F, "fundamentals", was the expected
present discounted value of profits accruing to current capital. Finally,
our assumptions about asset markets implied that (F/K) would also be equal
to (V/K), where V was the market value of current capital.
While maintaining the assumptions that marginal and average profit were
equal, we then allowed for either different information sets, or failures
of arbitrage, or bubbles. There was then no longer any reason to expect
(F/K), the managers' perception of the present discounted value of future
profits to equal (V/K), the market valuation, and the question became that
of whether managers would respond to (F/K) or/and to (V/K).14
This motivates our basic approach to the investment equation. Note that
q can be written as the product of the two terms, (F/K), "fundamentals",
and (V/F), "valuation", the ratio of market value to fundamentals:
(1) q —(V/K)—(F/K)(V/F)
This in turn suggests the following specification of the investment
equation, which allows both components of q to enter separately:
(2) ln(I/K) —c+a(L)ln(F/K) +b(L)ln(V/F) +E
Supposethat fundamentals, F, were observable. Then estimation of (2)
would be straightforward. The managerial perceptions hypothesis that firms
respond only to fundamentals as they perceive them would correspond to
b(L)—O. The alternative market perception hypothesis that firms respond to
movements in q no matter their source would correspond to a(L)b(L); a
weaker form of the hypothesis might be a(l)—b(l), that the sum of
coefficients on the fundamental and the valuation terms were equal.
The obvious problem is that F is not observable. This leads us to follow
two complementary approaches. The first is to use an observable proxy for
F and estimate equation (2). In Section III, we assume that F is simply
proportional to dividends, D. In Section IV, we construct F as the
projection of the ex post present discounted value of profits on
information available as of the time of the investment decision.The use
of a proxy for fundamentals leads however to a systematic bias in the
coefficients. The nature of the bias as well as its potential size are the
subject of Section V. Our second approach focuses instead on specific
episodes. It is based on the idea that, at a few times in the past, 1929,15
1987, there has been widespread suspicion of deviations of the market value
from fundamentals; we therefore regress investment on q, thus forcing the
coefficients on valuation and fundamentals to be same, and examine the
residuals of the equation during those episodes.
The data
We decided that the best data set for our purposes would be a long data
set, in which we could characterize the basic relation of investment to q,
profit, dividends and capital. Therefore we focused on annual data for the
US since 1900. This implied the construction of a q series for the period
1900 to 1958 (as a q series already exists post 1958). The details of
construction, as well as the q series for 1900-1988, are given in appendix
1. The appendix also gives sources for the other series used in
estimation. Series for profit are only available since 1916; all other
series are available from 1900 on. In all cases, we have tried to
construct variables which correspond to the private non financial corporate
sector of the economy.
The basic time series are plotted in three sets of figures. Figure la
plots the ratio of investment to capital, (I/K), against q, the market
We have also looked at the period 1952-1988 for which quarterly data
exist and thus quarterly regressions can be run. Another advantage of
looking at postwar data is that the information needed to go from the
differences between marginal and average q due to the tax system is
available. Because those data have already been examined at length by
other researchers, we do not report the results here. The results are in
general very similar to those reported in the text for the postwar sample,































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































value of capital divided by replacement cost. Figure lb does the same for
first differences of (I/K) and q. Figure 2a plots (I/K), this time against
the ratio of dividends to capital, (D/K) and figure 2b plots first
differences. Finally figure 3a plots (I/K) against the ratio of after tax
profits to capital, (fl/K), and figure 3b plots first differences ; because
profit series are not available pre 1916, figure 3 covers only 1916-1988.
Three characteristics emerge from these figures.
First, the series for q confirms the picture of q given by postwar data
(see for example Summers 1981). Just as there is the puzzle of why q was
so low (absolutely, and in relation to investment) in the 1970's, there is
the puzzle of why q was so low in the 10's and 20's. The crash of 1929 and
its after-effects are clearly visible: q decreases sharply from a high of
1.25 in 1929 to a low of .35 in 1932. But perhaps the most surprising
feature of the q series is its sharp rebound from 1932 to 1936, so that by
1936, q stands at its highest value for the period 1900-1988. This comes
from both a sharp increase in the stock market and -in contrast to other
sharp movements in q over the period- a sharp decrease in the nominal value
of the capital stock. The Cowles Commission index of stock price increases
from 48 in 1932 to lii in 1936. With gross investment being close to zero
from 1930 to 1933, the capital stock of the non financial corporate sector
decreases from 121 billion dollars in 1929 to 95 billion dollars in 1936.
There is a clear relation between (I/K) and either q, (D/K) or (fl/K).
But the relation is a not a tight one, especially at low frequencies. For
example, a given value of (I/K) is associated with a lower value of q in
the postwar period.(D/K) and (fl/K) both exhibit postwar downward trends17
which are not reflected in (I/K). The plots of first differences show
that, in all three cases, the relation is stronger at high frequencies.
It is not obvious from those graphs of first differences that (I/K) is
more strongly related to either q, (fl/K) or (U/K). The heteroskedasticity
in all four time series, with much smaller movements in the postwar period,
also makes the task of visually assessing fit difficult. Thus, as a way of
further describing the data, table 1 reports the results of simple horse
races.
In each case, regressions are run in first differences, with A(I/K) as
the dependent variable and a constant term and a distributed lag of either
q, (D/K), (fl/K) as regressors4. We use first differences as estimation
in levels with first order serial correlation yielded estimates of the
degree of first order serial correlation insignificantly different from
one. In each case, the regression is estimated over the period 1900-1939,
1948-1988 (or 1916-1939, 1948-1988 when profit is used), and over each of
the two subsamples separately. Leaving WWII years in -or leaving WWI years
out- makes little difference to the estimates. In each case one lag on the
independent variables is sufficient, and the lagged first difference of
investment is insignificant if included. The table makes two points:
These are first differences of levels, not of logarithms. The reason is
that profit is negative for a few years in the sample. Thus, we must use
the level of profit, and to allow for comparison of fits, use levels of the
other variables as well. Doing the regressions which include either D/K or
q in logarithms yields results similar to those in table 1.Table 1. Investment, q, dividends and profits
Dependent variable : (I/K)
Sample Lq(-l) DW Chow test
(SF level)
Full 0.007 0.026 2.22 .27
(1.4) (4.9)
.56
Prewar 0.011 0.025 2.34 .27
(1.4) (3.2)
Postwar -0.006 0.030 1.83 .26
(-0.8) (3.9)
(D/K) A(D/K)(-l) DW R2
Full 0.98 0.13 2.20 .28
(5.5) (0.7)
.22
Prewar 1.03 0.07 2.33 .34
(4.5) (0.3)
Postwar -0.02 1.62 2.04 .12
(0.0) (2.7)
(fl/K)(II/K)(-1)DW R2
Full 0.130.18 2.09 .46
(4.5) (5.7)
.67
Prewar 0.130.16 2.25 .55
(3.1) (3.9)
Postwar 0.210.28 1.87 .25
(2.5) (3.5)
Full sample : 1902-1939, 1948-1988 (1918-1939, 1948-1988 for profit
regressions); Prewar : 1902-1939 (1918-1939 for profit regressions);
Postwar : 1948-1988. tstatisticsin parentheses18
All three independent variables are significant. The horse races are
close : the R2's of the regressions are similar for q and for dividends,
and somewhat higher for profit.
The lag structures are sometimes different across subsamples. Lagged
dividends are highly significant prewar, current dividends highly
significant postwar. But in no case is there any statistically significant
evidence of subsample instability. Significance levels of the tests of
subsample stability range from .2 to .7
We now turn to estimation of the investment equation along the lines
developed earlier.
Section III : Dividends as fundamentals
Our first step is to use dividends as a proxy for fundamentals. The
rationale for this assumption comes from the work of Lintner (1956). From
interviews with managers, Lintner concluded that dividends were largely set
so as to be in line with permanent earnings as perceived by managers. The
model of dividends has often been used since, for example recently by Marsh
and Merton (1986) in their discussion of the work of Shiller. Using
dividends rather than earnings as a measure of fundamentals has the
additional virtue of avoiding issues relating to corporate liquidity
constraints, at least as compared with using earnings.
The equation we estimate is
(3) ln(I/K) —c+a(L)Lln(D/K)+b(L)1n(V/D)+eTable 2. Investment, with dividends as fundamentals
Aln(I/K) ln(fl/K) óln(D/K)(-l) ln(V/D) ln(V/D)(-l) DW R2
Sample:
full 0.42 0.17 -0.02 0.32 1.61 .39
(3.5) (1.6) (-0.3) (3.5)
prewar 0.56 0.14 0.05 0.23 1.81 .46
(2.8) (0.9) (0.4) (1.3)
postwar 0.08 0.34 -0.11 0.23 1.87 .26
(0.5) (2.2) (-1.6) (2.8)
Significance levels of tests of the following hypotheses (full sample):
set of coefficients on D/K different from zero : .4 xl03
set of coefficients on V/fl different from zero : .4 xlO'2
sum of coefficients on D/K and V/D are equal: .15
Full sample : 1902 to 1988; prewar : 1902-1939; postwar : 1948-1988
Table 2'. Investment, dividends and the dividend-price ratio
ln(I/K) ln(D/K) Lln(D/K)(-1) ln(PD) 1n(PD)(-1) DW
Sample:
full 0.47 0.12 -0.10 0.32 1.59 .40
(4.1) (1.2) (-1.2) (3.5)
prewar 0.56 0.13 -0.00 0.27 1.75 .46
(2.8) (0.9) (0.4) (1.3)
postwar 0.10 0.25 -0.10 0.17 1.94 .23
(0.6) (1.5) (-1.4) (2.5)
Full sample : 1902 to 1988; prewar : 1902-1939; postwar : 1948-198819
where first differences were imposed after finding that, when the equation
was estimated allowing for an AR(l) disturbance term, the degree of serial
correlation was not significantly different from one. Put simply, the
equation asks to what extent movements in investment are related to
movements in dividends or to movements in the dividend-price ratio (the
reason why this is not quite right is that V is not just the stock market
value, but the swn of the values of both stocks and bonds; we return to
this point below). The results are given in table 2, both for the whole
sample, and for the prewar and postwar periods separately (we leave war
years when using the whole sample, 1900-1988. Excluding them makes little
difference). At most one lag on each variable is statistically
significant.
The results are that both fundamentals, measured by dividends, and
valuation matter. The sets of coefficients on fundamentals and valuation
are both highly significant. The elasticity of investment with respect to
dividends is equal to .59 for the whole sample, nearly twice the elasticity
with respect to the market value given dividends of .32. .Butthe sums
of coefficients on fundamentals and the sum of coefficients on valuation
are not significantly different: one can reject the hypothesis that
investment responds to movements in q independently of the source of the
movements only at the 15% percent level. Results for prewar and postwar
samples yield the same general conclusion.
Table 2' takes a brief detour from our basic argument. As we mentioned
above, the regression reported in table 2 comes close to asking whether20 
investment is more responsive to dividends  or to the dividend-price ratio. 
It does not quite do that however, as it uses -appropriately  under our 
assumptions- the total value of the  firm rather than the stock market 
value.  The results of regressions of investment  on dividends and the 
dividend-price ratio (using the Standard and Poor index)  are reported in 
table 2'  .  The  specification is the same  as in equation (3) except for the 
replacement of (V/fl)  by the price-dividend  ratio.  While we cannot think of 
- 
a  structural interpretation for such a regression,  we report it for two 
reasons.  First, it requires much less  data construction than regressions 
using market value, and thus may allow for easier cross country comparisons 
later.  Second, a recent  paper by Robert  Barro (1989)  has argued that ex 
post rates of return on stocks -roughly  the first difference of the 
logarithm of the stock  price- dominate changes in q in explaining changes 
in investment.  The results of table 2'  are easily summarized: they are 
nearly identical to those of table 2,  both in terms of fit and individual 
coefficients.  This may not be great news for q, but indicates that our 
findings are robust to the use of total  market or stock market value. 
Returning to our basic argument, there  are two reasons why dividends may 
not be a good proxy for fundamentals.  First, our underlying model of 
dividends may be wrong and dividends may not be set  in line  with permanent 
earnings as perceived by managers (after having constructed the cx post 
present discounted value of profits in the next section, we shall be in a 
position to test whether and how well dividends  help predict this present 
discounted value, which they should if managers  have rational expectations 21 
and set dividends in line with permanent  earnings).  Second, even if they 
are set in line  with permanent earnings,  dividends will not capture changes 
in the required rate of return  which  will affect fundamentals.  Under the 
null hypothesis that only q matters, then any decomposition of q in the 
product of two terms does not mstter and our estimates of the effects are 
consistent.  But under the alternative  hypothesis that the valuation term 
matters less than fundamentals  or does not matter at all, those problems 
will likely lead to underestimating  the effect of fundamentals relative to 
valuation5.  This leads us to turn to an approach which, under the 
assumption of rational expectations,  takes care of the first of those two 
problems. 
Section IV.  Investment  and the present discounted value of profits 
Our second step is to construct the expected present discounted  value of 
profits and use it as our proxy for fundamentals. 
More precisely, we first construct  an ex-post present discounted  value of 
the ratio of after tax profits to the capital stock.  We construct it by 
There is a third reason  why dividends  may not be a good proxy for 
fundamentals.  We have disregarded  the difference  between  marginal and 
average q, a difference  which may well  be empirically important.  This case 
is however different from the other two.  In the other two,  the variable 
(V/K)  is the  appropriate  one under the market perceptions  hypothesis and 
only our decomposition is wrong.  In this case,  the variable (V/K)  is 
inappropriate even under the market  perceptions hypothesis.  As a result, 
our discussion of bias below does not apply to this case.  Indeed, it is 
difficult in this case to predict even the sign of the bias of the 
















































































































































backward recursion, assuming that the ratio of profitto capital after
1988, our last observation, was expected to remain equal to its1988 value.
As we are trying to measure the present discounted value ofprofits
accruing in the future to the current capital stock, we usea discount rate
of 20%, roughly the sum of the required rate ofreturn and the depreciation
rate. Varying the discount rate between 15% and 25% doesnot affect the
results in an important way. We shall refer to theex-post present
discounted value as PDV(fl/K), or PDV for short.Again as a descriptive
statistic, the projection of the ex-post valueon current and three lagged
values of q, (fl/K), (D/K) is plotted infigure 4, together with (fl/K)
itself. This projection can be thought ofan estimate of the ex-ante
present value.
The results of the regression usedto construct the projected series are
themselves of interest :q has no predictive value, while the sets of
coefficients on both (fl/K) and (D/K)are highly significant. The
hypothesis that current dividendsare a sufficient statistic for the
present discounted value of profits, ahypothesis corresponding to the
Marsh-Merton formalization of theLintner hypothesis under rational
expectations, is strongly rejected :current and lagged profits are
strongly significant, even in thepresence of current and lagged dividends.
We then estimate thefollowing equation:
(4) ln(I/K) —c+a(L)ln(pDV)+b(L)ln(V/pDV)÷
Because we use theex-post present discounted value, the equationmust be




Full -0.07 0.62 0.07 0.30 1.86 .43 (-0.3) (3.7) (0.5) (2.6)
Prewar 0.15 0.67 0.10 0.32 2.38 .58 (0.3) (2.4) (0.5) (1.2)
Postwar -0.39 0.56 0.00 0.27 2.04 .27 (-1.3) (1.8) (0.0) (3.1)
Significance levels of tests of the
following hypotheses sample): set of coefficients on PDV/Kdifferent from zero : .2xl0
set of coefficients on V/PDVdifferent from zero : .1x10
sum of coefficients on D/K andV/D are equal : .36
Full sample: 1918 to 1988;
prewar: 1918-1939; postwar: 1948.198823
differences, any variable in the information set at time t-lis a
legitimate instrument: we thus use lagged values of ln(q),ln(D/K) and of
lI/K, with one to three lags. Note that we use the level ratherthan the
logarithm of fl/K : this is because the value of fl/K isnegative in 1921 and
in 1931-1933. This is not an issue for theex-post PDV variable which is
always positive in the sample, so that we can take itslogarithm in
equation (4).
The results are presented in table 3, forthe whole sample as well as for
the pre- and post-var subsamples (standarddeviations are adjusted to take
account of the structure of the residual). The
image they give is
surprisingly similar to that given in table 2. Bothfundamentals and
valuation matter: the set of coefficientson each is highly significant.
Point estimates of the effects of
fundamentals are larger (.55 for the
whole sample) than those of the effectsof valuation (.37 for the whole
sample), but the difference between thetwo effects is still not
significant. A surprising feature is thenegative effect in the full and
the postwar samples of thecurrent present discounted value, which however
is insignificant and smallerin absolute value than the positiveeffect of
the lagged present value. Thisnegative coefficient becomes larger (while
the sum of coefficients
remains roughly unchanged) as the discountrate
used to compute thepresent discounted value becomes smaller.
This second set of resultsis very much dependent on theassumption of
rational expectations. It isalso subject to the other problemwe
mentioned at the end of the
previous section, time varying discountrates.24
In the next section, we focuson the nature and the potentialsize of the
bias inherent in our approach.
£ectlpn V. Proxies for fundamentalsand bias.
Using the dividend -or any other observablevariable, as a proxy for
fundamentals implies treating allmovements in the dividendpriceas
containing no information about fundamentals. This
is surely wrong, and
leads to systematic bias. What is the
nature and the potential size of the
bias ? As usual, the answerdepends on unobservable variables, butsome
progress can be nevertheless be made.
Suppose that the true model is givenby:
(5) ln(I/K) —aLln(F/i) +bln(V/F) +r
Comparedto the equation which underliesestimation in the previous
sections, equation (5) makes two siniplifjcatjonswhich will simplify the
algebra. It ignores the constantterm, and assumes away the lags. Assume
further, and again only to simplify thealgebra, that all terms are white
noise, an assumption which is roughlytrue of their empirical counterparts.
Now suppose that we use aproxy X for fundamentals, and estimate instead:
(6) ln(I/K) —aln(X/K) +fi 1n(V/X)+
Thequestion is then that of the bias ina and fi.Theanswer depends on
the correlation structure betweenF, X and V. The arguments abovesuggest
that the main issue is thata proxy such as dividends will onlycapture
only part of fundamentals, suggesting thefollowing correlation structure:
Assume that fundamentals have two
components, only one being captured by
X, so that:25
ln(F/K) —Aln(X/K)+c
where c is that component of the change in fundamentals notcaptured by X.
In the absence of good reasons to the contrary, assume furtherthat the two
components of fundamentals are mutually uncorrelated, and that each is
uncorrelated with the valuation term:
p(ln(X/K),) —p(ln(V/F),1n(X/1())—p(ln(V/F),e)—0
Finally define x c[O,l] as the proportion of the change in themeasured
valuation term due to fundamentals (for example, whenwe use dividends, the
proportion of the change in the dividend price ratio due tochanges in
fundamentals):
x —Var(e)/(Var(e)+var(eIlfl(v/F))
Simple algebra then yields the following formulas:
E(a) —a; E() —xa+(l-x)b;E(a-fl)— (l-x)(a-b)
Thus, under the market perceptions hypothesis that
a—b, misallocating
part of the fundamentals in the valuation term doesnot lead to bias. But
under the alternative hypothesis that fundamentalsmatter more than
valuation, this misallocation will lead toan upward bias on the valuation
term, thus to a downward bias on the difference betweena and b. Take for
example the results of table 2, whichuses dividends as a proxy for
fundamentals. Taking a and 48tobe equal to the sumofcoefficients on
(D/K) and (V/D) respectively, yieldsa—.59, 48—.30, and thus a-fl—.29.
Suppose that half of the change in thedividend price ratio is due to
fundamentals, half to true valuationeffects, bubbles, fads and the like.
Then, the above formulasuggests that the positive value of 48isdue to
bias, that the true value of b is infact equal to zero.26
Thus, while we wish it were otherwise, theconclusions one reachesdepend
on one's initial prior.
Suppose that one believed that therewere no fads or bubbles, that the
market value always reflectedfundamentals, and that the wholeestimation
exercise was useless. One would then
expect that dividing V/K in two
arbitrary components should lead to identicalpoint estimates on each of
the two components. The evidenceis that point estimatesare different but
not significantly so. Thus theprior would be little affectedby the
evidence.
Suppose that one believed instead that therewere fads or bubbles, and
that the market perceptionshypothesis were true. Then, estimated
coefficients would be unbiased estimatesof true parameters, andagain, the
evidence would not affect thatprior very much.
Suppose finally that one believed that therewere fads or bubbles, that
the managerial perceptionshypothesis were true, and that theconstructed
valuation term contained informationabout fundamentalsThen, one could
interpret the results as stronglysupporting the hypothesis. It is our
prefered interpretation, but we realizethat it is only one of three.
In our last section, hoping forstronger evidence, we focus on particular
episodes rather than on general timeseries evidence.
ctjon V. The crashes of 1929 and 198727
Looking at residuals
The rationale for our last set of regressions isstraightforward and
relies on a standard errors-in-variablesargument. Suppose that the
managerial perceptions hypothesis is correct, thatmanagers react to
fundamentals and ignore valuation. Thenq will be a proxy for
fundamentals, and its quality will depend on the size of thevaluation
term. In times when the valuation termislarge, investment will respond
less to q than would be predicted by aregression of investment on q,
leading to a specific pattern of residuals.
Again, the valuation term is unobservable. But thereare at least two
episodes during which there is widespread suspicion thatincreases in the
stock market were not primarily reflectingfundamentals, but also had an
important bubble component6.
The first is the increase in the stock marketleading to the crash of
October 24, 1929. While there waswas an increase in the stock market in
every year from 1922 on, the increase accelerated in 1928 and1929 and it
is at that time that market analystsstarted referring to the possibility
of a bubble. Table 4 gives the behaviorof the Cowles Commission index for
the period. The increase was associatedwith steady increases in the
6 A
literature survey of magazinesduring 1929 turned up a numberof such statements.For example, on september 7, 1929, BusinessWeek warned
Security speculation has eaten nearly all of itscredit cake. Stock prices
are generally out of line with safeearnings expectations, and the market is now almost wholly
"psychological" -irregular, unsteady, andproperly apprehensive of the inevitablereadjustment which draws near. . Butfor one such quote, onecan find in the same magazine others which
mock an unfounded apprehension of
bubbles. Similarly, before the 1987
crash, many thought of the increaseas a "catching up" effect from the
unrealistically low level of the 70's.Table 4: Stock Price Index
Cowles Commission % Change Standard & Poor's %Change Year All Stock Index Year500 Composite
1922 67.6 1980 118.7 1923 69.0 1.92 1981 128.0 7.8 1924 72.8 5.50 1982 119.7 -6.9 1925 89.7 23.2 1983 160.4 34.0 1926 100.0 11.4 1984 160.4 0.0 1927 118.3 18.3 1985 186.8 16.4 1928 149.9 26.7 (1985:1; 177.3)
(August : 148.3)
(1985:2; 184.8) 1929 190.3 27.3 (1985:3; 188.3)
(September: 225.2) (1985:4; 196.9) (October: 201.7) 1986 236.3 26.4 (November : 151.1)
(1986:1; 219.9) 1930 149.8 -21.2 (1986:2; 240.5)




1. Figures are annual orquarterly averages.28
price-earnings ratio aridsteadydecreases in the dividend price ratio. The
PE ratio, which stood at 10.9 at the end of 1926, had increased to 17.6 at
the end of 1928, decreasing to 13.3 at the end of 1929, after the crash.
The dividend price ratio, which stood at 5.1 at the end of 1926 had
decreased to 3.5 at the end of 1928, increasing to 4.5 after the crash.
The second is the increase in the stock market leading to the crash of
October 19, 1987. The stock market increased from 1984 on,accelerating in
1987, trIggering talk of speculative bubbles during thatyear. Table 4
gives the behavior of the S&P index for the period. Again, the episode was
associated with sharp increases in the PE ratio, sharp decreases in the
dividend price ratio. The PE ratio increased from 11 at the end of 1984to
20.3 in the third quarter of 1987, decreasing to 14.0 at theend of 1987,
after the crash. The dividend price ratio decreased from 4.8at the end of
1984 to 2.7 in the third quarter of 1987,increasing to 3.5 at the end of
1987.
To the extent that the managerial perceptionshypothesis is correct, that
managers were not responding, or not responding fully, to the increase,one
would expect -in a regression of the rate ofchange of investment on the
rate of change in q- negative residuals in theyears leading to 1929, and
positive residuals as the market declined from 1929 to1932, negative
residuals in the years leading to 1987, andpositive residuals in 1988.
The regression we run is therefore:
(5) ln(I/K) —c+a(L)1n(q)+c
Werun it both for the whole sample andseparately for each of the prewar
and Postwar subsainples. Theregressions and the residuals for 1925-1935Table 5. Investment and q
Dependent variable : ln(I/K)
Sample 1n(q) ln(q)(-1) DW R2 see
Full 0.14 0.38 1.72 .33 .12
(2.2) (5.6)
Prewar 0.25 0.37 1.97 .40 .15
(2.5) (3.7)
Postwar -0.07 0.25 1.84 .26 .05
(-1.1) (4.0)
Residuals
estimation (full sample) (prewar) (full sample) (postwar) 1925 .00 .02 1985 .01 .03 1926 .05 .04 1986 -. 15* -.09* 1927 .16* -.15* 1987 -.14* -.08* 1928 -.10 -.11 1988 -.02 -.03 1929 -.02 -.02
1930 -.23* -.19*





and for 1985-1988, from full and subsample estimation are given in table 5.
The results of the regressions are very similar to those of table 1, which
were run in first differences of levels rather than of logarithms. The
regressions show a strong effect of lagged q, a weak effect of currentq
(actually negative but insignificant in the postwar sample). This implies
that the timing of residuals we just discussedmay be off by a year.
Because investment responds in part to last yearq, the regression may
still underpredict investment even in theyear after the crash. With this
in mind, we look at the two sequences of residuals.
Residuals are consistently negative from 1926 to 1932, with thelargest
residuals occuring in 1930-1932. The 1926-1930 periodnicely fits the
hypothesis that there was a bubble, and that it was largelyignored by
managers. But the negative residuals in 1931-32 do not fit what one would
have expected under that hypothesis. Perhaps, the seriouscredit problems
of the early 30's are to blame; perhaps, fundamentalsdeclined after the
crash even more than the market allowed for. Andmost of the decline in
the real value of the market occured not in 1929 butbetween 1930 and 1932.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the residuals do not fitany of our
simple hypotheses.
The managerial perceptions hypothesis fares betterduring 1986-1988. The
residuals are large and negative in both 1986 and 1987(one must go back to
1958 to find a larger residual in the fullsample regression). The
residual from 1988 is still negative, but thisis easily explained by the
fact, reflected in the regression, thatinvestment spending in 1988 was
still largely the result of decisionstaken before october 1987.(We have30
not yet been able to construct the value of q for 1989, which
would clearly
be of interest here).
We have checked whether the behavior of investment in1987 and after
could be explained by the tax reform of 1986 and thechange in the relation
between marginal and average q it introduced. To doso we Constructed two
tax-adjusted q series for the postwar period; the two seriesare based on
different assumptions about the effects of dividendtaxation (see Poterba
and Summers (1985)). The residuals fromregressions using those tax
adjusted q were similar to those in table 5.
Financing and investment.
In section I, we argued that ifmanagers were going to respond to market
valuation even when it exceeded their assessment offundamentals, they were
likely to do this by issuing new shares as this is the simplestway of
effecting a transfer from new to existing shareholders. Thus, table 6
looks at the composition of investment finance for both the1929 and 1987
periods.
The evidence from the table is clear cut for each of thetwo episodes,
but the two episodes yield opposite conclusions. Net issues ofstock were
indeed unusually large for 1928 and 1929, with net issues of stocksbeing
nearly as large as retained earnings as a source of finance in 1929. This
can be taken as evidence that managers thought their shares were overvalued
in the late l920s. and as evidence in favor of the marketperceptions
hypothesis. The evidence from the 1987 goes mostly the otherway. Since











1925 8.72 7.53 (0.86)2.30 (0.26)2.79 (0.32) 0.61
1926 8.69 7.21 (0.83)1.84 (0.21)3.03 (0.35) 0.67
1927 7.93 6.18 (0.78)2.26 (0.28)3.55 (0.45) 0.68
1928 7.93 7.81 (0.98)4.34 (0.55)2.45 (0.31) 2.09
1929 10.06 7.82 (0.78)7.48 (0.74)0.66 (0.07) 5.06
1930 3.95 1.45 (0.37)1.91 (0.48)1.95 (0.49) 1.10
1931 0.88 -1.70 (-1.9)0.61 (0.69)0.22 (0.25) 0.19
1980243.7 200.1 (0.82)12.8 (0.05)27.6 (0.11) 12.67
1981286.5 239.4 (0.83)-11.4 (-.03)22.7 (0.08) 14.23
1982256.4 242.3 (0.94) 6.4 (0.02)18.6 (0.07) 13.40
1983270.6 285.6 (1.06)23.5 (0.09)16.0 (1.06) 29.79
1984370.6 336.2 (0.90)-74.4 (-.20)46.1 (0.12) 8.66
1985342.3 352.2 (1.02)-81.5 (-.23)73.7 (0.21) 18.38
1986331.4 357.4 (1.08)-80.7 (-.24)121.2 (0.36) 33.73
1987 361.3 352.7 (0.98)-76.5 (-.21)99.9 (0.28) 37.67
1. Figures are in billions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are ratios to capital
expenditures. Capital expenditures include fixed investment, change of inventories and
inventory valuation adjustment. Retained earnings include capital consumption
allowances. Net issues of stock include preferred stock as well as common stock.
2. Data before 1931 were constructed following table B-l9 in Goldsmith (1956). These
data include financial institutions, whereas data for 1980 and after refer to non
financial corporations, except for the last column.
4. In the last column, the data before 1931 is series 515 in Historical Statistics of
the U.S. (1975). The data after 1980 are gross proceeds from primary publicofferings
of conventional common stock in the various issues of Monthly Statistical Review, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. The two series are different inmany respects, as
explained in p998 in Historical Statistics of the U.S. (1975). Moreover, the data
before 1931 is different from Goldsmith's on which the third column of the table is
based. Goldsmith estimated net issues of stock from individuals'saving through common andpreferred stock.31
increase in share repurchases, takeovers,mergers and acquisitions.
Obviously, these developments have other sources than the decisionswe are
focusing on7; there is however no evidence that net repurchasesof stock
slowed down in 1986 or 19878
Thus, the evidence from the 1929 episode is mixed. Investmentbehavior
points, with a few puzzles, in the direction ofmanagers largely ignoring
the market, but the evidence on issues of new sharespoints the other way.
In the 1987, both financing and investment behaviorpoint support the idea
that managers largely ignored market developments.
Conclusion
We have already admitted to having started thispaper with a prior, that
managers probably largely ignored market valuation whenever that valuation
differed from their perceptions of fundamentals. Wesee the evidence as
consistent with that prior. But we also have to admit that theevidence is
not strong enough to sway those with different priors.Somebody who
believed either that there were simply no fads or bubbles,or that firms
followed market valuation would hold roughly the same views afterreviewing
the evidence we have presented.
This general conclusion is shared by two other recentpapers, Barro
(1989), and Galeotti and Schiantare].lj (1989). Barro uses a related
Historically, mergers and acquisitions have happened in periods of high
stock prices and high values of q (Golbe and White 1988).
8 Theevidence on gross issues of stocks does not showany clear pattern.
Gross issues were equal to 52b$ and 57$ in 1987 and 1986,up from their
values in 1984-5, but roughly the same as in 1983 (SecuritiesIndustry
Yearbook, various issues)32
approach and also looks at long time series for the US. One of his
findings is that the ex-post rate of return on the stock market dominates
the rate of change of q (Barro uses our q series). We find it interesting,
but have no ready explanation. Galeotti and Schiantarelli use our post war
quarterly data and a more formal, Euler equation, approach; they find no
evidence against the hypothesis that fads affect investment.
Reaching clearer conclusions will therefore require either superior
procedures for separating fundamentals and valuation errors, or bringing
more information to bear on the problem. This could be done by using
either international data or information on individual firms.33
Appendix I: Data Sources for the Construction of q.
We have constructed two series for g. The first is an annual series for
the period 1900-1958. The other is a quarterly series for theperiod 1952-
1988. The annual series for 1900 to 1988 used in the regressions is
composed of the annual series from 1900 to 1951, and the annual series from
time aggregation of the quarterly series thereafter.
The series were constructed as follows:
1> Market Value of Equity
The market value of equity of non-financial corporations was estimated by
dividing dividend payments by the common-stock dividend-price ratio.
a> Dividends paid by non-financial corporations.
1) For annual q: From 1922 to 1958, dividend payments by "all active
corporations" were retrieved from various issues of Statistics of Income.
Dividends paid by finance, real estate, and the related business sectors
were subtracted to get dividends from non-financial corporations. The real
estate sector was excluded since it could not be separated from the other
two before 1937. For the period from 1900 and 1922, the data cane from
table c-3l and c-6 in Studies of Saving in the United States, Vol I (1955).
In those tables, dividends from the banking sector (instead of the total
finance sector) are listed from 1900 to 1915. Financial corporations'
dividends were estimated by multiplying dividends from the banking sector
by 1.6 under the assumption that the banking sector accounted for almost 6034
per cent of the whole finance sector during this period. This assumption
is derived from the table 12 in Financial Intermediaries in the American
Economy Since 1900 (1958).
2) For quarterly q: This paper used dividend payments data from the DRI
Flow of Funds data bank. Because of the recent NIPA data revision, which
has reduced the value of dividends paid, q in this paper is smaller than q
found in Furstenberg (1977) by roughly 0.1, even though both series are
constructed in the same way.
b> Dividend price ratio:
1) For annual q: Before 1930, the Cowles Commission common stock yields
were used. After 1930, Moody's common stock yields ratio series were used
(series x479 and x483 in Historical Statistics of the U.S. (1975)).
2) For quarterly q: Standard and Poor's 500 common stock yields ratio was
used.
2> Market Values of Debt and Non-Interest-Bearing Assets.
1) For annual q: Studies of Saving in the United States, Vol III (1955),
presents balance sheets of non-financial corporations for the years 1900,
1912, 1922, 1929, 1933, 1939, and 1945-1958. Short term debt was netted
out from non-interest-bearing assets (e.g., cash, consumer credit, accounts
receivable,..) to calculate the book value of net non-interest-bearing
assets. This book value in turn was assumed to be the same as their market
value. Likewise, interest-bearing assets were netted out from the
Counterparts in the liability side to calculate net long-term debt. Using35
linear extrapolation, the book value of net long-term debt in eachyear was
calculated. This book value was converted into a market value using the
series x494 in Historical Statistics of the U.s. (1975): It amounts to
using Moody's corporate Aaa bond yield rate assuming a 20-year maturity for
conversion.
2) For quarterly q: The same method as in Furstenberg (1977) was adopted:
First, net non-interest-bearing assets ,netlong-term debt and net short-
term debt were calculated. Second, the market value of short-term debt was
assumed to be the same as its book value. The book value of net long-term
debt was converted to the market value by capitalizing net interest payment
figures by the yield rate on Moody's corporate A bond. The equation (1) in
Von Furstenberg (1977, p357) was used for conversion, assuming a ten year
maturity. All the data came from the DRI Flow of Funds data base.
3> Replacement Cost of Tangible Assets
1) For annual q: Studies of Saving in the U.S., Vol III (1955),
presents the replacement cost of total tangible assets in the U.S. from
1900 to 1958. By using the sectoral balance sheets (available for the 20
years listed previously), the proportion of non-financial corporations'
tangible assets to total tangible assets was extrapolated for the years in
which the balance sheets are not available. The ratios so calculated
ranged between 0.238 in 1900 and 0.287 in 1929. By multiplying this
proportion to the replacement cost of tangible assets in the U.S., the non-
financial corporations' tangible assets were calculated.
2) For quarterly q: Data came from the DRI Flow of Funds data bank.36
4> Calculation of q
q is defined as (Marketvalue of equity +marketvalue of debt -non
interest bearing assets)/Replacement cost of tangible asset. Note that
non-interest-bearing assets were subtracted from the numerator. This
differs from Von Furstenberg's method, which added them to the denominator
instead.
5> Investment.
The annual data on investment by non-financial corporations on equipment
and structure (from 1832 to 1987) were obtained from the BEA wealth tape.
The seasonally adjusted quarterly data after 1952 came from the DRI Flow of
Funds data bank.37
The series for annualq is
0 .607220
1 .811250 45 .656740
2 1.23872 46 .770330
3 .986740 47 .581990
4 1.08545 48 .525210
5 1.28335 49 .438690
6 1.18924 50 .495670
7 .904690 51 .465040
8 .925040 52 .483230
9 1.05977 53 .468880
10 1.03116 54 .528570
11 .973690 55 .650610
12 .987720 56 .637060
13 .980030 57 .575100
14 .790920 58 .604340
15 .808830 59 .733930
16 .775130 60 .708850
17 .538430 61 .796050
18 .396000 62 .752090
19 .393370 63 .846550
20 .389820 64 .915430
21 .356480 65 .995050
22 .462910 66 .902700
23 .503410 67 .924860
24 .495310 68 .965870
25 .631000 69 .868950
26 .679470 70 .704350
27 .787210 71 .769610
28 .980880 72 .829420
29 1.25887 73 .761610
30 1.11039 74 .513340
31 .707600 75 .473150
32 .357290 76 .509780
33 .568460 77 .460330
34 .905330 78 .418420
35 1.16509 79 .375690
36 1.28278 80 .385670
37 1.15208 81 .396340
38 .890620 82 .392380
39 1.08110 83 .523530
40 .823090 84 .524690
41 .672990 85 .582360
42 .508620 86 .720460
43 .642890 87 .839250
44 .632300 88 .74204038
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